C07(b) - Theoretical Approaches to International issues
Date: May 30 | Time: 03:15pm to 04:45pm | Location: Classroom - CL 431 Room ID:15703
Chair/Président/Présidente : Ali Dizboni (Royal Military College)
Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Stéphanie Martel (Queen's University)
Levels of Analysis Theory and Complexities of the Rise of Islamic State: Yaqub Ibrahimi (Carleton University)
Abstract: The rise and expansion of Islamic State (IS), previously known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), in 2014 has opened a new chapter in the history of Salafi-Jihadi groups. IS’s organizational complexity and strategic flexibility is the result of the organization’s evolution from several domestic, regional and global jihadi and insurgent groups that primarily pursued a variety of purposes. Unification of those scattered groups under a uniform organization is influenced by causes at different levels of analysis. Considering the issue, this paper investigates the driving forces behind the formation of IS through the ‘levels of analysis’ theoretical lens which primarily arose from international relations (IR) scholars’ debate on causes of peace and war in the world (Singer 1961; Waltz 1959). Drawing on this theory, I examine causes of IS at individual, group, and international levels. I hypothesize that personal motivation among individual extremists (at individual level), Salafi-Jihadism as a group ideology (at group level), and the United States post-Cold War foreign and military policies in the Middle East (at international level), all together, factored into the formation and expansion of IS. This method will provide a broad image of the formation of IS in which factors at all levels of analysis are examined and considered relatively significant. The article could motivate further scholarly debate on the usage of IR theories in examining causes and complexities of radical groups.
Trump, Reciprocity, and the LIberal International Order: Bryan Peeler (University of Manitoba)
Abstract: There is a growing tendency to argue that international law shapes the behavior of states via a logic of appropriateness rather than the logic of consequences stressed by realists and neoliberal institutionalism. In contrast, I argue that the core evolution in law is a more nuanced understanding of reciprocity. Building on Robert Keohane’s distinction between specific and diffuse reciprocity, I distinguish between two types of specific reciprocity: legal and strategic. While legal reciprocity involves the reciprocal commitments that states build into the wording of international treaties, strategic reciprocity can be used as a policy device regardless of the law. This understanding of reciprocity allows for an appreciation of domestic debates regarding international obligations that are often missed by other logic of consequences approaches.
I apply this understanding of reciprocity to the question of whether the liberal international order is under threat by the new US administration. Beginning in the 1990s, a critique emerged arguing that international law and other such institutions were created by global elites attempting to impose their cosmopolitan values and constrain US power. President Donald Trump has criticized numerous international institutions including NATO, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations and is likely to repudiate international norms in many issue areas. Applying my theory of reciprocity to this question may lead to a less pessimistic conclusion about international cooperation than has been argued for by others.