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    Canadian Political Science Association
    2018 Annual Conference Programme

    Politics in Uncertain Times
    Hosted at the University of Regina, Regina, Saskatchewan
    Wednesday, May 30 to Friday, June 1, 2018
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    Presidential Address
    - The Charter’s Influence on Legislation -
    - Political Strategizing about Risk -

    Wednesday, May 30, 2018 | 05:00pm to 06:00pm
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    Departmental Reception
    Department of Politics and
    International Studies

    Sponsor(s): University of Regina Faculty of Arts |
    University of Regina Provost's Office

    May 30, 2018 | 06:00pm to 07:59pm

Law and Public Policy



D10 - Federalism and Territorial Governance

Date: May 31 | Time: 10:30am to 12:00pm | Location: Classroom - CL 345 Room ID:15720

Chair/Président/Présidente : Kathryn Harrison (University of British Columbia)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Bruno Dupeyron (University of Regina)

Courts, Federalism and Policy in Uncertain Times: Canadian Cases of Medically Assisted Dying and Cannabis: Kathy Brock (Queen's University)
Abstract: THEORETICAL SIGNIFICANCE Canada is admired for its ability to balance innovation with stability. Federalism scholars attribute this virtue to the conservative influence of our intergovernmental institutions and division of powers: jurisdictions innovate but the federal divide checks hasty expansion or contraction of the state (Banting, Simeon, Baier). Judiciary scholars argue that courts are an impetus for social policy innovation but differ on whether the courts are a positive or destabilizing force (Hiebert, Morton and Knopff, Kelly, Russell). Despite the richness of these literatures, less attention is paid to how contentious social policy issues are handled across the intergovernmental (federal) divide and how the courts affect intergovernmental cooperation. This paper yields insight into the effects of the courts on the negotiation and implementation of social policy affecting federal and provincial jurisdiction by building on my previous analysis of the introduction of medical assistance in dying (MAID), a court initiated policy change, and comparing it with the legalization of cannabis (LOC), a policy change triggered by an election promise. RESEARCH QUESTIONS/ARGUMENT 1. Does the source of policy change matter? Does the motivating force affect the timing, nature of negotiations, range of solutions considered and final legislative form and substance? 2. Are policy solutions limited or broadened by having multiple institutions and governments and different citizen communities involved? How? METHOD OF ANALYSIS Qualitative analysis: comparative examination of the legislative schemes (proposed, actual), courts decisions, policy processes, points of intergovernmental collaboration (reports, task forces, ministerial and official meetings), hearings, primary documents and academic literature.

951.Brock.pdf


Les conséquences juridiques et politiques de la gouvernance économique de l’Union Européenne: Diego González Cadenas (Harvard Law School - Universitat de València), José Manuel Martinez Sierra (Harvard Law School)
Abstract: Suite à la faillite de Lehman Brothers en 2008, une crise financière majeure a éclaté sur les marchés financiers. Cette crise et ses effets - liquidité, flux de crédit, décélération de l'économie, etc. - ont répercuté sur l'économie réelle et ont touché plusieurs États membres de l'UE ainsi que les banques et institutions financières de l'UE. L'UE a réagi à cette crise en renforçant la gouvernance économique de l'UE. Une série de mesures de politique économique et de reformes des Traités l’UE ont commencé à s’établir tels que le Mécanisme européen de stabilité et le Traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et la gouvernance. En conséquence, les politiques économiques, budgétaires et fiscales des États membres sont surveillées afin de contrôler que États membres parviennent à réduire le déficit public, à équilibrer leurs budgets nationaux et à maintenir des finances publiques rigoureuses. Des nombreuses investigations ont largement étudié l'efficacité des mesures et des réformes mentionnées ci-dessus d'un point de vue économique. Cependant, peu a été dit d'un point de vue juridique et politique. En effet, l'adoption de ces nouveaux mécanismes de gouvernance économique européenne comporte d’importants doutes sur les moyens à travers lesquelles elles ont été adoptés et ses conséquences. Dans ce contexte, les panélistes établiront une cartographie des différentes mesures adoptées et illustreront comment, formellement et matériellement, certaines de ces nouvelles mesures sont entrées en vigueur au mépris du droit de l'UE et de la légitimité et la construction démocratique de l’UE.

1117.Cadenas.Martinez.Sierra.pdf


How Cooperative is Cooperative Federalism?: Christa Scholtz (McGill University)
Abstract: Dual federalism gives effect to the federal principle of governmental autonomy by defining and enforcing zones of exclusive legislative jurisdiction. Critics of the dualist approach argue that judicially-defined jurisdictional boundaries are most often arbitrary, but even if on occasion principled, hopelessly simplistic in a complicated and multidimensional policy space. The charge is that dualism’s fetish with legislative exclusivity runs the risk of impeding policy action and thereby increasing the risk of legislative vacuums. Cooperative federalism, with its emphasis on jurisdictional concurrency paired with paramountcy rules, is seen as more attuned to policy complexity, and hence more deferential to the institutional responsibilities of legislatures. This debate presumes the following dichotomy: that dualist (exclusivity driven) premises do not reliably ground intergovernmental legislative cooperation, while cooperative (concurrency driven) premises do. I develop a game theoretic model that explores the conditions under which cooperative equilibria are sustained, given uncertainty over the legal regime (concurrency or exclusivity), government costs to cooperate versus litigate, and various specifications for governments' underlying policy preferences.




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