Political Theory

H07 - Agency and Identity, Rationalization and Exclusion

Date: May 30 | Time: 03:15pm to 04:45pm | Location: Classroom - CL 410 Room ID:15706

Chair/Président/Présidente : Elaine Stavro (Trent University)

A Critique of the Procedural Self: Sacha Ghandeharian (Carleton University)
Abstract: This paper focuses on Habermasian attempts to reconcile the antinomy between, on the one hand, the universalist (humanist) moral and ethical approach found in all three generations of the Frankfurt School (Geuss 1981; Rush 2004), and, on the other, the anti-foundationalism characteristic of postmodern approaches to the question of the subject. The paper considers a significant effort at such a reconciliation – that is, between a universalist ethics and contingent theory of the self – offered by Seyla Benhabib and her ‘narrative model of identity’ (1999). This model suggests that it is the ability to build a coherent narrative of one’s personal identity, rather than to identify a core self, that is morally salient; by focusing on narrative, Benhabib asserts that she is able to reconcile the universal (that is, the notion of a coherent narrative) and the contingent (the lack of a transcendental self). Drawing upon McNay’s post-structural critique of Benhabib’s ‘narrative model of identity’ (2003), this paper will argue that Benhabib is not as successful as first appearances suggest because she relies on an overly simplistic – and cohesive – notion of narrative in relation to the self. This paper concludes that the debate between Benhabib and McNay is indicative of the broader ways in which the problematique that is ‘the subject’ is left unresolved by a Habermasian and/or procedural approach. This paper also demonstrates the ways in which post-structural and/or post-modern approaches – offering a decentralized and contingent notion of the self – can be politically ineffective.

Beyond Facts and Values: Max Weber and Martin Heidegger’s Political Responses to the ‘Crisis’ of Disenchantment: Timothy Berk (University of Toronto)
Abstract: In this paper I compare Weber and Heidegger’s philosophic and political responses to the perceived crisis of rationalization and disenchantment. I argue that it is their respective philosophic responses to the problems of disenchantment and rationalization that define their clashing political outlooks. I begin by introducing the connection between rationalization and disenchantment for both thinkers, making the case that these Weberian concepts have their Heideggerian equivalents. I then look at how they proceed to comprehend the philosophic consequences of this crisis. For Weber the scientific understanding of the world necessitates a sharp distinction between facts and values. Despite his misgivings, Weber argues that we must resist the temptation to reject the scientific worldview by conjuring religious, cosmic, or mystical groundings for our ‘values’. Instead, we must recognize the ‘facts’ of an indifferent cosmos, facing them with sobriety and a sense of responsibility in both politics and the sciences. Heidegger, however, rejects Weber’s formulation and replaces the opposition between facts and values with that of the ‘correct’ and the ‘true’. Heidegger argues that we do not owe our allegiance to mere scientific ‘facts’ concerning ‘beings’ but rather to the truth of Being, which cannot be fully understood through scientific rationalism. In place of Weberian ‘tragic sobriety’, Heidegger’s ‘tragic romanticism’ attempts to unite politics and religion in order to address the crisis of disenchantment or rationalization. As Weber forewarned, however, Heidegger’s attempt to overcome the fact/value distinction, and with it disenchantment, contributed to his support of the most reprehensible of political regimes.