Posters

P08 - Poster Sessions - Group 2

Date: May 31 | Time: 08:45am to 10:15am | Location: Laboratory - LB 142 - Lab Café Room ID:15688

Judges/Juges: : Frédéric Bastien (Université de Montréal) / Joshua D Goldstein (University of Calgary) / Tamara Small (University of Guelph)

CPSA Poster Prize - Terms of Reference
Prix de l’ACSP pour une présentation visuelle - Mandat

Ontario’s Independent Legislative Officers: Safeguarding the Principle of Responsible Government or Endangering it?: Harmeet Sandhu (Ontario Legislature Internship Programme)
Abstract: The stature and power of Ontario’s independent legislative officers has increased significantly over the past decade. Legislative officers analyze government operations and routinely disseminate expert reports to Ontarions however, some researchers have cast doubt on their ability to fulfill the accountability function on behalf of the public (Collier and Malloy, 2017: 87). Additionally, others have expressed concern over the significant power that legislative officers have to interpret their respective mandates, as well as the adverse implications that their high-profile position and reports can have on policy development (Cohn, 2017). In light of the divergent perspectives that exist within the literature, there is growing need to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the role that Ontario’s independent watchdogs play within the legislative branch of government. The proposed paper will examine the individual mandates of Ontario’s legislative officers, as well as the impact that they have on democratic accountability. Specifically, the primary research question that this paper will attempt to answer is as follows: considering that one of the central functions of the legislature is to hold government accountable, does the extension of the scrutiny function to unelected legislative officers support or undermine the principle of responsible government which the Westminster parliamentary system is premised upon? The paper will rely on qualitative data which will be collected during semi-structured face-to-face interviews with eight of Ontario’s current legislative officers.

1191.Sandhu.pdf

Mandate Expansion and Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner: Ana Qarri (Ontario Legislature Internship Programme)
Abstract: In the 2016 report to the legislature, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC) recommended that his office’s powers should be expanded. More specifically, the Commissioner recommended that the IPC should have expanded “investigation, order-making and audit powers.” The Commissioner has also argued that the increased use of big data in the public service requires new privacy legislation and more audit powers. Canadian provinces have developed different models for privacy and information oversight. Currently there is a gap in the academic literature that studies the process of mandate expansion for independent officers of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario. This paper seeks to fill that void through a case study of the IPC’s request for mandate expansion. The paper will comprise two parts: a) a theoretical discussion of mandate expansion for independent oversight offices in the Westminster system, and b) a case study of the IPC’s mandate expansion process. In addition to a literature review and theoretical discussion, the paper will use semi-structured interviews with relevant actors, including legislative clerks, commissioners, and assistant commissioners. I predict that there is no existing framework that dictates how a commissioner seeks expanded powers, and there is an expectation that advocating for these changes will be a long process. Additionally, due to the impact of tech innovation on the IPC’s mandate, many recommendations stem from research conducted by the office and dialogue with counterparts in other provinces and countries.

1199.Qarri.pdf

Officer or Servant? The Independence of Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer of Health, Past and Present: Kassandra Loewen (Ontario Legislature Internship Programme)
Abstract: The unique role and powers of the CMO lie somewhere in between that of a legislative officer and civil servant, thus inspiring academic and practical interest in CMO independence. In the context of the CMO, independence refers to: the ability to communicate directly with the legislature and Ontarians; access to a protected budget; protection against being fired without cause; and ability to issue emergency orders to protect citizens in the case of a public health crisis. In Ontario, the powers and independence of the CMO are prescribed in the Health Promotion and Protection Act, 1990 (HPPA). This legislation has been amended regularly over the past 27 years, and a number of these amendments have impacted the independence of the CMO. CMO independence is important because it may help ensure that public health decision-making is evidence-based, rather than driven by political convenience. Interestingly, there are significant differences between jurisdictions with regards to degree of CMO independence. A preliminary literature review failed to identify any publications exploring factors that may contribute to these cross-jurisdictional differences. This, this research asks: What drives political interest in increasing the independence of the CMO? What institutional structures or historical legacies limit the independence of the CMO? These questions will be addressed by conducting semi-structured key informant interviews with all living (and consenting) past CMOs, as well as with the current CMO (again, pending consent), as well as through cross-jurisdictional comparisons with New Brunswick, the federal government of Canada, and the United Kingdom.

1200.Loewen.pdf

Studying the Implementation Rates of the Reports from Ontario’s Auditor General and Ombudsman: Daryl Gonsalves (Ontario Legislature Internship Programme)
Abstract: While the literature on the Auditor General and Ombudsman have looked at their role within responsible government, their influence on government public policy, little attention has been paid to the implementation rates of the reports produced by these two provincial offices and their relationship with Ontario’s government. What are the implementation rates from the reports of these two provincial independent offices? How have the implementation rates changed over time? How does the government interact with these independent offices and does this relationship affect implementation rates? This study will utilize a quantitative and qualitative methodology to understand implementation rates of these reports. Using a quantitative lens, the number of recommendations, the progress made on each recommendation and the deadline given will be considered. Multiple reports from these offices will be considered to determine what if any changes occurred over time. However, looking at numbers will not allow us to fully understand implementation rates. Using a qualitative lens, semi-structured interviews with various relevant actors will allow for a nuanced understanding the office of these two independent watchdogs and their relationship with the government. I put forth the thesis that a more collaborative, proactive, communication based relationship between government and the independent officers results in higher implementation rates. Based on my findings for both the offices, I will also put forth recommendations to increase implementation rates and create better relationships between government and the independent offices that hold them accountable.

1202.Gonsalves.pdf

Why Should the Government Select a Committee?: the Legislative Impact of Ontario's Select Committee on Mental Health and Addictions, 2010: Josef Méthot (Ontario Legislature Internship Programme)
Abstract: Scholars have noted that select committees can be important “agents of public policy” (Brown et al. 2003). Although their mandate is limited to investigating, reporting and advising, they can greatly influence policy by allowing a broad public input on an issue. Yet the use of select committees in the Canadian Parliamentary context has been relatively rare (Malloy 1996); in Ontario, a select committee has not been struck since 2013. Some MPPs suggest that the Government is reluctant to concede any decision-making power to a legislative committee (Khraplyva). Little research has been done on the legislative significance and impact of a select committee within Parliament, especially under centralized majority governments. Ontario's 2009-10 Select Committee on Mental Health and Addictions (SCMHA) is a valuable case study to assess the potential opportunities or drawbacks of select committees to address complex policy areas like mental health. This paper will consider the legislative, political, and policy impact of the Select Committee over the last seven years, using interviews with former members, and surveying discussion of the committee's final recommendations in Hansard, government announcements, and the media. Due to their unique mandate and role within the legislative context, recommendations of a select committee assume an appearance of tri-partisan consensus and evidence-based authority. They offer government valuable feedback and political capital for major changes. Yet the SCHMA has also been a convenient measure of the government's progress and a source for opposition criticism, which may explain the paucity of new select committees in Ontario in recent years.

1204.Methot.pdf