Provincial and Territorial Politics in Canada and Beyond

J17 - Dynamics of Provincial and Federal Political Institutions

Date: Jun 1 | Time: 10:30am to 12:00pm | Location: Classroom - CL 408 Room ID:15769

Chair/Président/Présidente : Anthony Sayers (University of Calgary)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Jerald Sabin (Western University)

Recent Changes in the Alberta Cabinet 2006-2017: Keith Brownsey (Mount Royal University)
Abstract: This paper will the examine the efforts made to reform the organization of the Alberta cabinet between December 2006 and 2017. This period saw six premiers, seven ministers of finance, numerous other cabinet ministers and the defeat of the forty-four year old Progressive Conservative government by the Alberta New Democrats. Through all this the organization of the cabinet with its various standing policy and traditional cabinet committees remained remarkably stable until it was replaced by the New Democrats in May 2015. The Alberta cabinets from 2006 until 2017 are a case study of institutional stability, even rigidity. When Conservative premier Ralph Klein came to office in December 1992, he redesigned the cabinet system. Klein and his senior advisors created a cabinet system designed to streamline decision making and provide a voice for the caucus in executive decision-making. After Klein left office in December 2006, his cabinet system remained in place. Several efforts were made to change or abandon the Klein structure, but the Progressive Conservative caucus strenuously resisted any reform efforts. The institutional drift lasted until the New Democrats returned the government to a more standard cabinet structure in 2015. Using the concepts of drift, layering and critical juncture to explain the resilience and the eventual replacement of the Klein cabinet structure, the paper will describe and, it is hoped, offer at least a partial explanation for the stability and eventual replacement of the executive decision making process in Alberta from 2006-2017.

859.Brownsey.pdf

A Province in All But Name: The Political and Constitutional Evolution of Yukon since 1978: Ian Peach (KTA Inc.)
Abstract: Canada’s federal community is actually a much more complex community, with many more constituent members, than the Constitution Acts would suggest to the casual observer. Yukon, in particular, is a much more robust, independent member of the federation than the our constitutional text would give one a hint of. Its status began to change, fundamentally and irrevocably, with the provision of responsible government in 1979. Today, since the full implementation of the 2002 Yukon Act in 2013, the territory has the status of a province in all but name. This paper will review the history of Yukon's political development since the establishment of responsible government to demonstrate that the territory's responsible government, and that government's powers, have equivalent constitutional protections to those of the provinces. As a matter of fundamental constitutional principle, part of the unwritten principle of democracy, once responsible government is granted to a jurisdiction and that government is given a set of powers, the government that granted responsible government and the defined set of powers cannot repeal the grant. That is certainly the principle one can take from the evolution of Canada’s independence from Great Britain. In fact, it is possible that the only example of responsible government being reversed in the British Empire or Commonwealth was in Newfoundland in 1934, and that was done after the Newfoundland Legislature voted itself out of existence in 1933 and Newfoundland accepted a constitution like those of colonies directly administered by Britain and the establishment of a Commission of Government.

1000.Peach.pdf

Comparing Provincial Legislative Performance: Paul Thomas (Carleton University), JP Lewis (University of New Brunswick Saint John)
Abstract: How can the performance of Canada’s provincial legislatures be measured and compared? Canada’s provincial legislatures all have the same constitutional responsibilities, and review roughly the same number of government bills each year. Yet they vary enormously on a range of factors including number of members, sitting days, use of committees, procedures, and the incorporation of backbenchers into the work of the government. While some steps have been taken to explore potential differences in legislative capacity across provinces (e.g. Thomas and White, 2015: Thomas and Lewis, 2017), we know very little about how such differences actually shape the ability of legislators to have a meaningful impact on legislative outcomes. To begin this process, we construct a data set tracking the passage of government legislation in each province, examining a range of metrics including the time spent in debate and the number of interveners, witnesses heard, and amendments proposed and accepted. This information will then be analysed against legislative characteristics to explore whether some arrangements yield more influence for ordinary members. The findings will shed light on questions of institutional design, and also explore the ways to address concerns about the democratic deficit in modern politics.

Understanding Canadian Bicameralism: Past, Present and Future: Gary O'Brien (Retired - former Clerk of the Senate and Clerk of the Parliaments)
Abstract: The study of Canadian bicameralism has mostly focused on the Senate model and paid little attention to its antecedent forms. This is unfortunate as any plan for future Senate reform needs to be fully aware of the values bicameralism has brought to pre- and post-Confederation Canada and the role it has and can play in fulfilling its central purpose which David Thompson, (Political Ideas, Penguin Books, 1966, pp. 12) in reference to Montesquieu, describes as addressing “the problems of relationships between governments and governed.” This paper will inquire into the constitutional and political dimensions of the various forms upper houses have taken, both in pre- and post-Confederation Canada, specifically the appointed councils of the old colonial systems; the two designs used in the Province of Canada after the coming of responsible government (partisan appointed and then elected); provincial legislative councils before their abolition; and the post-Confederation Senate model based on regional equality and centrally nominated. The paper will conclude on assessing reform proposals for twenty-first century Canadian bicameralism and how it may impact on power and efficiency relations within the Canadian political system.

1214.O'Brien.pdf