Canadian Politics

A01 - Parliament and Governance

Date: May 30 | Time: 08:45am to 10:15am | Location: Classroom - CL 232 Room ID: 15702

Chair/Président/Présidente : Paul Thomas (Carleton University)

Discussant/Commentateur/Commentatrice : Alex Marland (Memorial University)

The Bureaucracy of Immigration in Canada: Mireille Paquet (Concordia University)
Abstract: Canada’s approach to immigrant selection and immigrant integration, often described as the “Canadian model”, has enjoyed a relative stability since the end of the Second World War. This paper explores another partial contributor to the “Canadian model” of immigration: the contemporary role of the federal department of immigration. Beyond the fact of Canada’s stable bureaucracy several elements points to the importance of the bureaucracy as a central actor in the model. Historical accounts point to a very proactive and powerful immigration bureaucracy in the pre-1960s period. Indeed, the story of the creation of Canada’s immigration policies are first and foremost histories of bureaucratic dominance over political actors and societal forces. Contemporary accounts of the department of immigration are rare and conflicting, yet point to the importance of Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) as a site of creativity, societal brokerage and power struggles. Building on historical accounts of the role of the department of immigration in policymaking and using insights from public administration, this paper asks: how is Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada contributing to the contemporary Canadian model, beyond policy implementation. Based on findings from field research in Ottawa, I show that Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada is a central institution underpinning the “Canadian model”. As an institution, it encompasses preferences and particular resources. Focusing on policymaking during the 2006–2015 period, the paper also demonstrates how Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada contributes to the maintenance and the adjustment of the “Canadian model” by influencing policymaking.

The Right to Refuse Dissolution as a Democratic Reform?: Tyler Chamberlain (Trinity Western University)
Abstract: Recent years have seen a rise in interest and concern over the centralization of power in the Canadian Prime Minister’s Office. Politicians, journalists, and academics alike have decried the “elected” or “friendly” dictatorship into which the office of First Minister has transformed. This paper will review several of the solutions on offer before proposing and defending an alternative solution, namely strengthening the Crown’s right to refuse advice of First Ministers, under particular circumstances. This solution will be presented via the Constitutional Traditionalism of Eugene Forsey and John Farthing, two Canadian political thinkers whose arguments have been, I suggest, vindicated by recent experience. The final section will reflect on, and hopefully clarify, the tension between strengthening the power of unelected Governors General and the project of democratic reform. It will do this by reviewing some of the relevant recent literature on the potential conflict between the logic of electoral competition and the logic of good governance, including, but not limited to the work of Fukuyama (2014), Zakaria (1997, 2007), Brennan (2016) and Achen & Bartels (2016). I will conclude by suggesting that a proper conception of democratic reform in a Westminster system must not be reduced to merely increasing voter input, but must balance responsiveness to voters with the ability of the House of Commons to hold the Prime Minister and Cabinet to account.

804.Chamberlain.pdf

Federalism Through Parliament in Accordance with the Constitution Act (1867): Vincent Pouliot (Institute of Responsible Government)
Abstract: In the Reference regarding the secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada defines federalism as the political structure and the political mechanism permitting the conciliation of unity with diversity (par.43). Furthermore, they state: to be legal, this political process must be expressed within the public institutions created under the constitution (par. 67); that the Constitution Act (1867) was an evolutionary step (par.63); that the Fathers of Confederation assured the people the Canadian union would be able to reconcile diversity with unity (par.43); but that the representative and democratic character of our public institutions was simply assumed (par 62). The Supreme Court of Canada thus lets it be understood that the political structure and the political mechanism to conciliate the people’s local interests with their common interests in the government of Canada are based on a system that existed at the time of Confederation. The purpose of this paper is to review Canada’s constitutional evolution to determine the political structure and the democratic mechanism permitting the conciliation of the unity with the diversity of Canada east and Canada west in the government of the Province of Canada; and, how this system was meant to be adapted to guarantee the individuality of the Maritime provinces and Quebec ((John A. Macdonald, Debates, pp,40-41), which was the sine qua non condition to their acceptance of Confederation (Pope, Confederation p.119). This paper will bring to light the legal and constitutional role of the Senate in the government of Canada.

812.Pouliot.pdf

Protecting Privacy? The Policy Impact of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada: Emmett Macfarlane (University of Waterloo), Gwyneth Bergman (Queen's University)
Abstract: Officers of Parliament play a vital role in providing parliamentarians with technical expertise and scrutiny on a variety of key issues, including auditing government accounts, protecting against conflicts of interest, and ensuring that public and private information is protected. Although the officers are meant to operate within a mandate defined by statute, and were instituted to provide supplemental aid to parliamentarians in their duty to hold the government of the day to account, officers are said to have significant control over the public policy areas they oversee. Drawing on work conducted for a broader SSHRC-funded project on officers of Parliament, the proposed paper will provide a comprehensive case study of the privacy commissioner. The paper will draw from a systematic analysis of the reports, recommendations, and committee appearances of the privacy commissioner in order to assess how influential the privacy commissioner is in directing the attention of parliamentarians towards specific policy issues. The primary goal of this paper will be to determine how successful the privacy commissioner is at having policy recommendations implemented, and whether the privacy concerns of parliamentarians are dictated by the commissioner’s reports. Addressing these issues will provide significant insight into the policy impact of the commissioner, and will lay the foundation for analyzing the broader impact of the officers of parliament on policy formation more generally.